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Abstract
This paper develops a dynamic Heckscher-Ohlin model and studies the in-
teraction between international trade and wealth distribution dynamics. I also
study how diﬀerences in the cost of ﬁnancial intermediation among countries may
aﬀect the pattern of trade and wealth dynamics. Relative to the inequality it
would have prevailed under autarky, I ﬁnd that trade promotes a decline (an in-
crease) in inequality when the economy converges to the steady state form below
(above). However, with trade inequality increases (declines) during the transition
from below (above). I also ﬁnd that trade may alleviate frictions in the ﬁnan-
cial intermediation sector in economies where these frictions are larger. In those
economies, trade may in fact promote a higher income than under autarky.
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In the theoretical literature on international trade, the Stolper-Samuelson theorem
stands as one of the main results about income distribution. Roughly speaking, the
theorem states that with the opening to international trade, prices of relatively abun-
dant factors increase and prices of relatively scarce factors decrease. This change in
factor prices is the consequence of a more specialized production in goods that use
intensively relatively abundant factors.1 Thus, the theorem describes the changes in
the functional distribution of income of an economy that opens to international trade.2
Changes in the functional distribution of income would translate one-to-one in changes
in the personal distribution of income in some economies, for instance, in economies
inhabited by “pure workers” and “pure capitalists”. However, it is not obvious how
these changes may aﬀect personal inequality in income and/or wealth in less polar-
ized societies. Perhaps surprisingly, the eﬀects of international trade on the personal
distribution of income have received little attention in the theoretical literature.3 In
stead, how development and growth may aﬀect income and wealth inequality is an
old theme in macroeconomics (see, for instance, Kuznets (1955), and Stiglitz (1969)).
Furthermore, recently there is a large literature showing that intermediation costs and
other frictions in the ﬁnancial sector have sizable eﬀects on growth rates and steady
states.4 What are the international trade eﬀects on income/wealth inequality among
households? How does international trade in goods aﬀect the role of the ﬁnancial inter-
mediation sector? How do frictions in ﬁnancial intermediation interact with trade and
wealth dynamics? The goal of this paper is to provide an answer to these questions.
In this paper I extend the study by Chatterjee (1994) about the dynamics of the
distribution of income and wealth in a standard one-sector neoclassical model of growth
to the case of a dynamic Heckscher-Ohlin model of international trade. Chatterjee
1There are several empirical applications of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem as an explanation for
observed wage diﬀerentials between skilled and unskilled workers in trading economies. The empirical
evidence supporting the theorem is mixed. For example, Wood (1997) reports that the skill premium
narrowed in some East Asian countries during the 1960s and 1970s, while it widened in Latin American
countries during the 1980s and 1990s. See also the results in Robertson (2001) for the speciﬁcc a s eo f
Mexico after the NAFTA.
2Ripoll (2000) develops a three-good, three-factor, dynamic model and shows that in addition to
relative abundance of factors, the timing of the opening to trade has sizable eﬀects on steady states
and on the dynamic path of factor prices.
3This is not so in the empirical literature, to which I will brieﬂy refer below. Among theoretical
studies, Fischer and Serra (1996), and the more closely related paper by Das (2000). The main
diﬀerences between the study by Das and mine are that he develops an overlapping generations
model with imperfect competition in production, whereas I assume inﬁnitely lived agents and perfect
competition in all markets. Also, in his model capital is tradeable, whereas in my model it is not.
4Levine (1997) contains many references and he also reports some evidence about the diﬀerences
in the ﬁnancial sector between rich and poor countries; see also the more recent survey Smith (2002).
1(1994) showed that in an economy where agents diﬀer only in their initial wealth,
the transition towards the steady state from below (from above) may have a negative
(positive) eﬀect on the degree of lifetime wealth/income inequality prevailing in the
economy.5 His ﬁndings are relevant in the study of the eﬀects of international trade
because in a dynamic model, trade is likely to give rise to a diﬀerent steady state than
under autarky. Following Atkeson and Kehoe (2000), I analyze the case of a small
open-economy that trades goods with the rest of the world at equilibrium prices in
international markets. In particular, I assume that all economies are identical and
that the only diﬀerence among them is that the rest of the world is already at the
steady state. Because of the small open-economy assumption, trade has no eﬀects
on the distribution of wealth in the rest of the world. Nevertheless, the distribution
of wealth in the small economy does change over the transition to the steady state.
Over a transition to the steady state from below (when the initial stock of capital
is smaller than its long run level), these changes in the small open-economy are the
result of two conﬂicting eﬀects: an “international trade” eﬀect, which tends to reduce
inequality in the functional distribution of income, and a “transition” eﬀect that tends
to increase inequality in the personal distribution of income and wealth (the opposite
holds over a transition from above). I show that if the opening to trade occurs once
the small economy is suﬃciently close to its steady state under autarky from below
(from above), personal inequality in wealth falls to a permanently lower level (jumps
to a permanently higher level) than under autarky. Then I use numerical methods
to study the long run level of inequality when the economy opens to international
trade far away from the steady state (i.e., starting from arbitrary levels of capital). I
ﬁnd that inequality in wealth and income increases (declines) over the transition from
below (above) to the steady state with trade. However, inequality is always smaller
(larger) than under autarky. In this sense, my results suggest that the “international
trade” eﬀect dominates the “transition eﬀect”. I also look at timing eﬀects of the
opening to international trade. My results suggest that, irrespectively of whether
the economy converges to the steady state from above or from below, the sooner an
economy opens to international trade, the smaller will be the level of inequality in the
long run.
I extend the previous results and investigate how international trade aﬀects the role of
the ﬁnancial intermediation sector, and how diﬀerences in this sector among countries
may aﬀect the pattern of trade and the evolution of inequality.6 Diﬀerences in the
ﬁnancial intermediation sector are introduced in the model by diﬀerent depreciation
5Caselli and Ventura (2000) extend these results in a continuous time model with additional sources
of heterogeneity (preferences and labor productivity); see also Sorger (2000) where the eﬀect of a
leisure/labor decision is studied.
6Acemoglu and Ventura (2001) also consider diﬀerences in the ﬁnancial intermediation sector in
their study of the world income distribution.
2rates of capital and diﬀerent transaction costs in the rest of the world and in the small
open-economy. I show that small economies where costs of ﬁnancial intermediation
are large, tend to completely specialize production in labor intensive goods. Thus, the
diﬀerences in the ﬁnancial intermediation sector have sizable eﬀects on the determina-
tion of the pattern of production and international trade. This result holds in the long
run even if the small economy has initially comparative advantage in the production
of capital intensive goods, i.e., its capital labor ratio is larger than in the rest of the
world. Thus, an interesting implication of the diﬀerences in intermediation costs is
that the opening to trade may entail a decline in the stock of capital. This means that
a small economy that has been growing for some time, may start depleting capital after
the opening to international trade. Over such a transition, wealth inequality would
increase at ﬁrst, suddenly jump at the moment of opening the economy, and then
continue declining towards the steady state level prevailing under trade. Therefore,
diﬀerences in the cost of ﬁnancial intermediation and trade may reverse the pattern
of capital accumulation and wealth dynamics.
It is well known that the steady state level of capital of an economy completely special-
ized in the production of labor-intensive goods is smaller than it would under autarky
(see Atkeson and Kehoe (2000)). Interestingly, I show that the real income at the
steady state with trade may be larger than under autarky if the ﬁnancial intermedia-
tion cost in the economy is suﬃciently large compared to that in the rest of the world.
In other words, international trade alleviates the eﬀects of costly ﬁnancial intermedi-
ation in economies where these costs are larger. This ﬁnding is interesting because
the combination of diﬀerences in the cost of ﬁnancial intermediation with trade may
provide a smaller amount of capital than under autarky, a larger income than under
autarky, and over the transition, wealth inequality would be declining. Finally, I show
that international trade may “immiserize” an economy where transaction costs in the
ﬁnancial sector are only slightly larger than in the rest of the world. This result holds
even if there are no “terms of trade” eﬀects, as prices of goods are determined in the
rest of the world and they are constant.
The results I just described suggest that in general, the opening to international trade
does not necessarily imply a decline, or a rise, in inequality of the personal distribution
of wealth. In this sense, my results are consistent with the available empirical evidence.
For instance, Wei and Wu (2001) ﬁnd that openness to trade and urban-rural inequality
are negatively associated in Chinese cities; Edwards (1997) reports that trade reforms
do not seem to aﬀect income distribution, and Litwin (1998) ﬁnds that trade openness
in general worsen income distribution.7 Also, Sala-i-Martin (2002) ﬁnds that income
7On the related issue about growth an inequality, Edwards (1997) also reports some evidence
suggesting that countries that grew faster observed an increase in inequality. Deininger and Squire
(1996, pg. 588) ﬁnd “no systematic relationship between growth of aggregate income and changes
3inequality within-countries has increased over the period of globalization, although
this eﬀect is too small to oﬀset the large decrease in across-country disparities. At the
end of the paper I brieﬂy discuss an extension of the current model that could help to
empirically assess more sharply the eﬀects of growth, and possibly trade, on wealth
inequality.
The paper continues as follows: Section 2 introduces a world with many competitive
economies, section 3 describes equilibrium dynamics under autarky and shows that
the results in Chatterjee (1994) can be extended to two-sector economies. Section
4 studies the eﬀects of trade on the distribution of wealth of a small open-economy.
Finally section 5 investigates the eﬀects of diﬀerences in the ﬁnancial intermediation
sector on the pattern of trade and wealth dynamics, and section 6 concludes. An
appendix at the end of the paper contains proofs and a description of the numerical
methods used in section 3.
2 The model
There is a large number of small economies. These economies are identical in all
respects except perhaps in the initial distribution of capital and in the technology
available to transfer resources across time. A typical economy is described in the next
sections. In what follows capital characters denote aggregate variables, lower case
characters denote per capita variables and individual variables are denoted by lower
case characters with a script i.
2.1 Production
In each economy production is organized in two sectors, one producing a ﬁnal good that
can be devoted to consumption and investment, and the other producing intermediate
goods used as inputs in the ﬁnal goods sector. In the intermediate goods sector there
are two industries producing goods x and y. In each industry there is a large number
of perfectly competitive ﬁrms that take goods and factor prices as given. In this sector
technologies for production display constant returns to scale and the only diﬀerence
between them is that they use primary inputs in diﬀerent intensities:
Xt = Kθ
x,tL1−θ




y,t , with θ,η ∈ (0,1). (1)
In the previous equations the subindex x and y on the primary factors indicate amounts
used in the production of each good. Assuming θ > η then the production of x is capital
in inequality as measured by the Gini coeﬃcient”, meaning that along the growth path, inequality
increases in some countries while it declines in some others.
4intensive. Furthermore, by assuming Cobb-Douglas technologies I am also ruling out
factor intensity reversals, thus for all possible relative factor prices the capital labor
ratio in industry x will be larger than that in industry y. Firms in these industries rent
capital and labor in each period so as to maximize proﬁts, thus the optimal decisions
are characterized by the following conditions:
rx,t ≥ px,tθKθ−1
x,t L1−θ





with equality whenever Kj,t > 0f o rj = x,y and
wx,t ≥ px,t(1 − θ)Kθ
x,tLθ−1





with equality whenever Lj,t > 0f o rj = x,y and where rj,t and wj,t stand respectively
for the rental rate of capital and labor in each industry in period t.8
The ﬁnal goods sector is also perfectly competitive. The technology displays constant




t ,w i t h
γ ∈ (0,1). Normalizing the price of the consumption/investment good to one, opti-
mal decisions for proﬁt maximization of ﬁrms in this sector are characterized by the











Each economy is inhabited by N agents indexed by i =1 ,2,3,...N.E a c h o f t h e s e
agents behaves so as to maximize the present value of the utility derived from the





where β ∈ (0,1) is the subjective discount factor, the same for all agents. In the rest
of the paper it will be assumed that preferences take the form of u(ci
t)=l o g ( α + ci
t),
where α is a real number (the same for all agents). In case α < 0 then marginal utility
of consumption can be arbitrarily large even for strictly positive levels of consumption.
The interpretation in this case is that there is a minimum consumption level and it
will be required that α + ci
t ≥ 0. As shown in Chatterjee (1994), the implications of
8In the previous expressions I take into account that complete specialization is possible with inter-
national trade, thus equilibrium prices may not coincide with the value of marginal productivity of
factors in all sectors.
5trade on the personal distribution of wealth I derive in this paper will also hold under
a more general class of utility functions.9
2.3 Endowments
Agents are endowed with ki
0 units of productive capital in the ﬁr s tp e r i o d .T h ei n i t i a l
endowment of capital is the only diﬀerence among agents. To transfer capital across
periods agents have access to the following investment technology:
ki
t+1 = ii
t +( 1− δ)ki
t. (6)
In the previous equation δ ∈ (0,1) is the depreciation rate of capital. In addition
to the initial endowment of capital, in the beginning of each period agents receive a
perfectly divisible unit of time which they inelastically supply as labor. Both capital
and labor are freely mobile across ﬁrms in the intermediate goods sector.
2.4 An agent’s problem
For the maximization of the objective in Equation (5), agents collect capital and
labor incomes and decide current consumption and how much to invest or desinvest to
obtain the desired stock of capital for the next period. The following budget constraint
formalizes the set of possible consumptions and investments for an agent starting a










t),j = x,y. (7)
In the previous equation li
j,t and νi
j,t stand respectively for the fraction of labor and
capital supplied to the j industry, thus li
x,t + li
y,t =1a n dνi
x,t + νi
y,t = 1. The budget
constraint can be simpliﬁed by noticing that if both intermediate goods industries are
in operation, then perfect competition in factor markets and free mobility of primary
factors ensures that equilibrium rental rates of capital and labor will be the same in
both industries. If, alternatively, only one industry is active, then it will also be the
case that there will be a unique market wage and interest rate of equilibrium. Thus
given equilibrium factor prices agents are indiﬀerent with respect to where to supply
capital and labor. Taking these facts into account the problem agents need to solve
9This class includes u(c)=ρ(α + ψc)
σ with a) σ < 1b u td i ﬀe r e n tf r o mz e r o ,ρ =1 /σ, ψ =1
and α a real number, or b) σ =2 ,ρ = −1/2, ψ = −1a n dα > 0. It also includes the case of
u(c)=−α exp(−ψc)w i t hb o t hα and ψ strictly positive.
6can be written formally as follows:
max
P∞








t +( 1− δ)ki
t,
ci
t ≥ max{0,−α},k i
t ≥ 0, ∀t ≥ 0, given ki
0.
(8)
In the previous problem agents take prices as given and it is assumed that the initial
condition for capital is large enough so that the solution for consumption is interior.























t is composed of the real value of capital at the end of the period plus
the real present value of labor. This measure of wealth is useful for the purposes of
this paper because it captures changes in factor-prices, and variations in goods and
factor prices are a central issue in international trade theory. Repeated substitutions
of Equation (9) in the budget constraint in (8) and the use of the previous deﬁnition
provides the following expression for an agent’s consumption in period t:
ci
t =( 1− β)ωi







In the following section I describe the equilibrium dynamics under autarky for one of
the economies.
3 Competitive equilibrium under autarky




t,w t,r t} such that markets for primary factors and intermediate goods clear and
that the aggregation of optimal decisions of agents satisfy the following market clearing
















7where xt and yt stand for the production of intermediate goods in per capita terms.
Notice that since both intermediate goods are fundamental in the production of the









Let lt be the fraction of total labor used in the production of x in a period t.L e ta l s o
νt be the fraction of per capita capital used in the production of x. Then the stock
of capital in per capita terms used in the production of each intermediate good can
be written as kx,t = νtkt and ky,t =( 1− νt)kt. Since primary factors are perfectly
mobile across industries, in equilibrium it must be the case that wx,t = wy,t and










It follows that the fraction of capital devoted to the production of x is constant over
time and is given by ν∗ = θγ/(η(1 − γ)+θγ). Using the fact that prices of primary










1 − ν∗. (15)
Therefore the fraction of labor devoted to the production of the intermediate good x
is also constant over time and is given by l∗ =( 1− θ)γ/((1 − η)(1 − γ)+( 1− θ)γ).10
With the expressions for l∗ and ν∗ the market clearing condition for ﬁnal goods can













where A and ξ are constants involving l∗ and ν∗ and other parameters in the production
technologies.11 Finally, since individual consumption in Equation (11) is linear in
wealth, then consumption per capita is independent of the distribution of wealth.
Since wealth in Equation (10) is linear in capital, it follows from the previous equation
that per capita capital depends only on the consumption of an agent that has the
average capital in the economy. Therefore the evolution of capital over time can be
studied by means of the problem of a central authority that solves
max
P∞
t=0 βt log(α + ct)
s. to ct + kt+1 = Ak
ξ
t +( 1− δ)kt
ct ≥ max{0,−α},k t ≥ 0, ∀t ≥ 0, given k0.
(17)
10Notice therefore that in the autarky equilibrium where the economy produces both intermediate
goods the equilibrium νt and lt are always given by ν
∗ and l
∗, independently of the available amount
of capital. Also, θ > η implies that l
∗/ν
∗ < 1. This fact will be relevant in section 5 below.









1−γ and ξ = θγ + η(1 − γ).
8This problem is a version of the neoclassical model of growth studied at length in the
literature. Since α can be negative I will assume that the initial stock of capital is
larger than some lower bound k ≥ 0 so that the feasible set is not empty. I will also
assume that k <k ∗.12 The following proposition states some well known properties of
the solution to the previous problem and thus is stated without proof.
Proposition 1. Under the maintained assumptions if k0 >kthen there exists a sequence
{ct,k t+1} that solves the planner’s problem. The sequence {ct,k t+1} monotonically
converges to stationary values {c∗,k∗} satisfying (i) Aξ(k∗)ξ−1 − δ =( 1− β)/β,a n d
(ii) c∗ = A(k∗)ξ − δk∗.
The solution for capital from the previous proposition can be used to recover all
equilibrium prices using Equations (2), (3) and (13), and with them, it is possible
to study the dynamics of the personal distribution of wealth.13 From the budget
constraint of an agent and the deﬁnition of wealth it is easy to see that total wealth














Therefore the evolution of personal wealth depends on the consumption to wealth









t − ωt) > (≤)0.
The previous observation and Equation (18) imply that if an agent’s wealth is larger
than per capita wealth and the term a(tR) is positive, then that agent will accumulate
wealth at a faster rate than the rest of the economy, i.e., his wealth share will increase
over time. The measure of inequality in wealth I will use is Lorenz-dominance on
wealth shares (denoted si
t), which I deﬁne next.
Deﬁnition. Order agents according to increasing wealth. A vector {si
t} is said to







t for all 1 ≤ K ≤ N,w i t hs t r i c t
inequality for some K.
With this notation in place the dynamics of the distribution of wealth are completely
described by the following proposition:
12If α ≥ 0, then k =0 . F o rα < 0 the feasible set will be empty unless there exists a solution to
Ak
ξ +α−δk = 0. I will assume that the previous equation has two solutions an that the smaller one
satisﬁes k <k
∗,w h e r ek
∗ is the unique k satisfying the following condition (i) in the text.
13The rest of this section introduces some notation for individual wealth and wealth shares before
I state a theorem due to Chatterjee (1994).
9Proposition 2 (Chatterjee 1994, pag. 104). a(tR) > (≤)0 ⇔ α(kt − k∗) > (≤)0.T h u s
if α(kt − k∗) > (<)0,t h e n{si
t} Lorenz-dominates (is Lorenz-dominated by) {si
t+1}.
Furthermore, if α(kt − k∗)=0 ,t h e n{si
t} = {si
t+1}.
I will refer to a situation where k0 <k ∗ and thus, the stock of capital will be growing
over time, as a transition from below. Conversely, a situation where the stock of capital
decreases over time towards its steady state level will be called a transition from
above. Thus, an implication of Proposition 2 is that over a transition from below the
distribution of personal wealth becomes more unequal over time if there is a subsistence
requirement (α < 0). In the following section I study the implications of the previous
proposition once the economies engage in international trade in intermediate goods.
4 Wealth dynamics in a small open-economy
Following Atkeson and Kehoe (2000), I study the eﬀects of trade on the distribution
of lifetime wealth of a small economy that starts its development process once the
rest of the world has reached the steady state. In particular I assume that all but
one economy started growing towards the steady state at the same time and with the
same level of initial capital. This means that whether these economies were allowed to
trade in intermediate goods over the transition to the steady state is of no consequence.
Therefore the equilibrium dynamics for these economies are described by Propositions
1 and 2 above: all economies converge to the same steady state independently of the
initial distribution of wealth, and at the steady state the only diﬀerence among them
is in the stationary distribution of wealth.
Consider now the equilibrium dynamics of the economy that starts its process of
development once the rest of the world has reached the steady state. This economy
can trade intermediate goods at the international equilibrium prices. Since aggregate
dynamics do not depend on the initial distribution of wealth, the evolution of this
economy can be described by the decisions of a central authority that buys and sells
intermediate goods in international markets and that organizes in an eﬃcient way
domestic production. As in the preceding section, it is useful to write the problem
in per capita terms so that the planner chooses the fraction of available capital and
labor to be devoted to the production of each intermediate good. Using the notation
introduced so far the problem of the central authority can be described as
10max
P∞
t=0 βt log(α + ct)
s. to ct + kt+1 =( xd
t)γ(yd















ct ≥ max{0,−α},k t ≥ 0,l t ∈ [0,1],νt ∈ [0,1]∀t ≥ 0,
given k0.
(19)
In the previous problem the ﬁrst equation is the feasibility constraint that restricts
consumption and capital accumulation to the sum of current output and undepre-
ciated capital; the second and third equations simply relate the domestic supply of
intermediate goods to the technology constraints; the forth equation is the condition
for balance in international trade. After substituting domestic supply of intermediate
goods in the balanced trade equation, the following equations describe the ﬁrst order





x ≤ 0,x d
t ≥ 0,
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t (1 − lt)1−η
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− λν








y(1 − η)(1 − νt)ηk
η
t (1 − lt)−η
i
− λl
t ≤ 0,l t ≥ 0,










t+1 (1 − lt+1)1−η
i




t stand for the non negative Lagrange multipliers associated to
the feasibility constraint, balance in trade and feasibility for νt and lt respectively. A
version of Proposition 1 can be shown to apply to the current planner’s problem. In
particular, Atkeson and Kehoe (2000) show that the steady state of the late-bloomer
depends on the initial endowment of capital. To see this in the current discrete time
version of the model, assume for a moment that for all k the solutions for l and ν are






(1 − θ)η(1 − lt)+θ(1 − η)lt
. (21)















(1 − θ)η(1 − lt)+θ(1 − η)lt
. (22)
The implication of the previous equation is that for given intermediate goods prices of
equilibrium in international markets, if the initial condition for capital is suﬃciently
small then the economy specializes in the production of the labor intensive good.
Conversely, if the economy starts out with a suﬃciently large amount of capital, then
it will specialize in the production of the capital intensive good. Therefore there is
an interval [ky,k x]k n o w na st h econe of diversiﬁcation such that if k0 / ∈ [ky,k x]t h e
late-bloomer specializes production completely.14 It is straightforward to show that
the interval [ky,k x] constitutes the set of rest points for the late-bloomer.15 Therefore
if k0 <k y then βR0 > 1 and the economy keeps accumulating capital over time and
converges to ky. Over this transition Proposition 2 applies and after the opening to
trade the distribution of wealth becomes more unequal if α < 0 and more equal if
α > 0. Similarly, if k0 >k x then βR0 < 1, thus after the opening to trade the
stock of capital decreases over time converging to kx and over the transition inequality
decreases (increases) if α < 0( α > 0). If the initial stock of capital lies in the
interval [ky,k x], then there is a reallocation of primary factors but the economy does
not initiate a transition to a new steady state. For k0 ∈ [ky,k x]P r o p o s i t i o n3b e l o w
describes the changes in the personal distribution of wealth after the opening to trade
assuming α < 0. The proof of Proposition 3 uses Lemma 1.
Lemma 1. Let ˆ k1 = k∗((1−ν∗)/(1−l∗))(1−η)/(γ(θ−η)) and ˆ k2 = k∗(ν∗/l∗)θ/((θ−η)(1−γ)).
Then ˆ k1 <k y and kx < ˆ k2,a n di fˆ k1 ≤ kt <k ∗ (k∗ <k t ≤ ˆ k2)t h e nwt ≤ ˆ wt and
rt ≥ ˆ rt (wt ≥ ˆ wt and rt ≤ ˆ rt).
Proof: See the Appendix.
In the previous lemma wt, rt stand respectively for the equilibrium wage rate and
interest rate corresponding to a given stock of capital in operation in a period t if
the economy remains under autarky, and ˆ wt and ˆ rt are the corresponding factor-





θ((1 − θ)/(1 −
η))
1−θ)





η((1 − θ)/(1 − η))
1−θ)
1/(η−θ).
15To see this, notice that when the late-bloomer specializes completely in the production of y




y .F o r t h e e a r l y -






η−1.S i n c e e a r l y





y = γ/(1 − γ)Bk








∗.U s i n gt h ed e ﬁnitions
for l
∗,ν
∗ and ky given above, it follows that ky = k
∗(1 − ν
∗)/(1 − l
∗). Therefore ky is in fact a rest
point for the late-bloomer. A similar argument applies to show that kx = k
∗ν
∗/l
∗,t h u skx is also a
rest point, as well as convex combinations of ky and kx.
12prices if the economy opens to trade in that period. Therefore Lemma 1 states that
a version of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem holds for k0 ∈ [ˆ k1,ˆ k2]. If the economy is
far away from the steady state under autarky then rt < ˆ rt when kt < ˆ k1 (rt > ˆ rt if
kt > ˆ k2), and yet ˆ wt/ˆ rt >w t/rt when the economy specializes in the labor intensive
good (ˆ wt/ˆ rt <w t/rt when it specializes in the capital intensive good). Thus the
Stolper-Samuelson theorem still holds, in the sense that the income accruing to the
relatively abundant factor increases more than the income accruing to the relatively
scarce factor.16
Proposition 3. Assume α < 0, order agents according to increasing wealth and let ¯ i
be the “name” of the agent with the largest wealth share smaller or equal to 1/N.I f
ky ≤ k0 <k ∗ (k∗ <k 0 ≤ kx), then
3.1: ˆ si
0 ≥ (≤)si
0 for i ≤¯ i and ˆ si
0 < (>)si
0 for i>¯ i,
3.2: {ˆ si
t} = {ˆ si} ∀t ≥ 0,
3.3: {ˆ si} Lorenz-dominates (is Lorenz-dominated by) {si
t} ∀t ≥ 0.
Proof: See the Appendix.
The intuition behind 3.1 is that when the stock of capital is suﬃciently close to its
steady state level under autarky, the change in factor prices following the opening to
international trade beneﬁts (worsen) more those agents for whom labor income repre-
sents a larger fraction of their wealth if the economy is approaching the steady state
from below (from above). Speciﬁcally, the opening to trade “compresses” (expands)
the distribution of wealth shares but preserves its ordering. 3.2 says that inside the
cone of diversiﬁcation the personal distribution of wealth remains constant over time
once the economy opens to international trade, because goods and factor-prices are
constant. Since under autarky the economy would still observe a transition to the
steady state, 3.3 follows from 3.2 and Proposition 2. Therefore the conclusion is that
i n s i d et h ec o n eo fd i v e r s i ﬁcation the “transition” eﬀect is null and there is only the
the “international trade” eﬀect of Lemma 1.
Far from the steady state under autarky the “international trade” eﬀect discussed
above runs counter to the “transition” eﬀect described in Proposition 2. In particular,
even though capital may be the relatively scarce factor in the late-bloomer economy,
agents that own an amount of capital larger than the per capita capital will observe an
increase in their share of lifetime wealth over the transition to the new steady state with
trade. Can the “transition eﬀect” reverse the “international trade” eﬀect? Although a
continuity type of argument can be invoked to show that the conclusion of Proposition
16To see this, notice that wt/rt =( ( 1− η)/η)((1 − ν
∗)/(1 − l
∗))kt for a given level of capital
under autarky and the same ratio under trade with specialization in the production of y is ˆ wt/ˆ rt =
((1−η)/η)kt. The deﬁnitions of ν
∗ and l
∗ given before imply that ˆ wt/ˆ rt >w t/rt.As i m i l a ra r g u m e n t
applies for kt > ˆ k2.
133 holds for initial capitals close to the cone of diversiﬁcation, I have been unable to
obtain analytical results for arbitrary initial conditions.17 In stead, I extended the
previous analysis using simulations (the numerical method I used is described in the
Appendix at the end of the paper). I have simulated the late-bloomer economy under
several initial conditions for capital, personal distribution of wealth and parameter
values characterizing technologies and minimum consumption requirements. Figures
1 and 2 display the typical evolution of inequality over the transition to the steady state
for a late-bloomer economy under autarky and once the economy opens to trade.18 In
all cases I ﬁnd that the “international trade” eﬀect dominates the “transition” eﬀect:
when the economy opens to international trade inequality falls (jumps), and over the
transition it remains at a lower (higher) level than what it would under autarky.
Figures 3 and 4 display the evolution of inequality under autarky and under trade for
the small economy opening in diﬀerent dates. That is, the ﬁgures oﬀer a picture of
what could be gained (or lost) in terms of inequality if the economy opens in period t+j
i n s t e a do fi np e r i o dt. Figure 3 corresponds to a transition from below. It shows that
the latter occurs the opening to international trade, the smaller will be the reduction in
inequality and the larger it will be in the long run. Figure 4 corresponds to a transition
from above, and it reveals that the latter occurs the opening, the larger will be both
the increase and the level of inequality at the steady state. To gain some intuition
to understand these ﬁndings, it will be convenient to use the Coeﬃcient of Variation
(standard deviation over the mean) as the index to measure inequality. It follows
from Equation (10) that inequality in the period the economy opens to international
trade is given by cv(ωi
t)=( Rt/ωt)sd(ki
t), where Rt and ωt represent the interest factor
and average wealth under trade, and where sd(ki
t) is the standard deviation of capital
holdings under autarky. Thus, inequality at the moment of the opening is a function
of Rt/ωt. This ratio is decreasing when the economy converges to the steady state
with trade from below, and it is increasing when the economy converges from above.
This follows from the fact that the interest factor an average wealth are, respectively,
decreasing and increasing in the stock of capital for the given prices of goods in the
international markets. Furthermore, Proposition 3 asserts that there will be a fall
(jump) in inequality even if the stock of capital is close to k∗. Thus, the falls (jumps)
17The main diﬃculty is that I need to compare equilibrium paths and steady states under autarky
and trade. The problem is that the speed of transition is faster the further away the economy is from
the steady state (i.e., suggesting that it is faster under autarky than with trade), but at the same
time, the speed should be smaller the smaller is the capital share (i.e., suggesting it is faster with
trade than under autarky, (see King and Rebelo, 1993)). Thus, I could not exploit the transitivity
property of Lorenz orderings as in theorems 2 and 3 in Chatterjee (1994).
18For simplicity, the index of inequality I used in the simulations is the Coeﬃcient of Variation in
lifetime wealth (standard deviation over the mean). This index to measure the diﬀerences in inequality
in two distributions is equivalent to Lorenz dominance whenever the two distributions do not cross.
14observed in the previous pictures at the moment of the opening reﬂect the changes over
time in Rt/ωt.T h e s er e s u l t so ﬀer a diﬀerent picture of the previous ﬁnding that the
“international trade” eﬀect dominates the “transition” eﬀect: the sooner an economy
opens to international trade, the smaller will be the level of inequality in the long run.
5 Financial intermediation and trade
In this section I study the relationship between diﬀerences in the ﬁnancial intermedi-
ation and international trade. In particular, I study how diﬀerences in the ﬁnancial
intermediation sector may determine the pattern of trade and the evolution of inequal-
ity, and how trade may aﬀect the role of ﬁnancial intermediation.
5.1 The pattern of trade and inequality
For simplicity, I start looking at the eﬀects of diﬀerences in the depreciation rate of
capital. Latter I study the eﬀects of costly ﬁnancial intermediation in a more explicit
way. Assume that all but one small economy have the same depreciation rate δ as
before, and that in the remaining economy ¯ δ > δ. Assume also that the opening
to trade occurs after all economies in the world have reached the steady state under
autarky. I will continue assuming that the economy with larger depreciation rate is
small enough to be unable to aﬀect equilibrium prices in the rest of the world, which
as before I will treat as a single economy.19 Since under autarky all economies produce
both goods, then all economies devote the same amounts of labor (l∗,1 − l∗)a n dt h e
same fractions of capital (ν∗,1 − ν∗) to the production of intermediate goods x and
y. Furthermore, since both economies are at the steady state, for both economies the
net return to capital is equal to the rate of time preference (1 − β)/β.I tf o l l o w st h a t
k∗ >k ∗
¯ δ because the gross return to capital r is decreasing in capital. Therefore at the
steady state under autarky the diﬀerences in transaction costs give rise to diﬀerences
in the stationary stock of capital. If B = ((1 − ν∗)/(1 − l∗))η(l∗/ν∗)θ((1 − l∗)/l∗), it





















thus the diﬀerences in the depreciation rate are able to create comparative advantages
which will be potentially exploited with international trade. Speciﬁcally, for the small
economy with larger depreciation rate, in principle it will be proﬁtable to reallocate
19The variables corresponding to the economy with a larger depreciation rate will be denoted with
a subindex ¯ δ.
15primary factors to increase the production of the labor intensive good y and reduce
the production of the capital intensive good x. The interesting question is, how large
will be the reallocation of primary factors? Is it possible for the economy with larger
δ to reallocate capital and labor and still produce both goods at a steady state with
trade? The answer is
Proposition 4. When the economies diﬀer in their depreciation rates the cone of di-
versiﬁcation for capital completely collapses.
The proof of Proposition 4 is based on the factor-price equalization theorem (see
for instance Samuelson 1996). If prices of goods are the same in both economies
then positive production of both goods in both economies and identical technologies
for production (absent factor intensity reversals) lead to equal factor prices in both
economies, in particular, r∗
¯ δ = r∗. But since ¯ δ > δ,t h e nr∗ +1− ¯ δ < 1/β = r∗ +1−δ,
therefore the economy with larger depreciation rate cannot be at a steady state.
The implication of Proposition 4 is that the economy with larger depreciation rate will
specialize production in one intermediate good in any equilibrium with international
trade. The dynamics under trade for the economy with larger depreciation rate of
capital are slightly diﬀerent from the ones in the previous section. Let k¯ δy denote
the new steady state stock of capital under trade, and suppose that k¯ δy is larger or
equal than the lower end of the diversiﬁcation cone we found before, ky.A t t h a t
level of capital we found that at the equilibrium prices given in international markets
ry(ky)+1−δ =1 /β, so that the economy was at a steady state. Since ry is decreasing in
the level of capital (for the given p∗
y)a n d¯ δ > δ, it follows that ry(k¯ δy)+1− ¯ δ < 1/β,
that is, k¯ δy would be too large to be sustainable as a steady state level of capital.
The implication is that the new steady state level of capital k¯ δy <k y.T h u s , f o r
k¯ δy ≤ k ≤ k∗ consumption initially increases after the opening to trade, but over the
equilibrium path towards the new steady state both consumption and capital will keep
decreasing for all agents.
What are the dynamics for the economy with larger depreciation rate with other
initial conditions? If k0 is suﬃciently small the economy would specialize production
in the labor intensive good as before, and it would converge to a lower steady state
(in terms of capital) than under autarky. To be possible for the economy with a larger
depreciation rate to specialize production in the capital intensive good x, its initial
capital has to be suﬃciently large, but in addition, the corresponding steady state level
of capital k¯ δx must be larger than k∗ (otherwise the economy would have comparative
advantage in the labor intensive good y). In particular, the following restriction on

























When the restriction in (24) is satisﬁed the steady state with complete specialization in
x lies in (k∗,k x). This means that there are levels of capital such that in the beginning,
the small economy may completely specialize production in the capital intensive good.
However, over the transition to the steady state the pattern of production will suddenly
change, and the economy will completely specialize in the production of the labor
intensive good. Of course, for suﬃciently diﬀerent δ and ¯ δ the previous condition will
be violated and then the only possible steady state involves complete specialization in
the labor intensive good.21 Summarizing:
Proposition 5. With international trade in intermediate goods and ¯ δ > δ,
5.1 If k0 ≥ kx for the economy with a larger depreciation rate and the restriction
in (24) is satisﬁed, then the economy completely specializes production in the capital
intensive good and converges from above to k¯ δx ∈ (k∗,k x).
5.2 If k0 ≥ kx and condition (24) is not satisﬁed, or if k∗ <k 0 <k ¯ δx,i nt h eb e g i n n i n g
the economy specializes completely in the production of the capital intensive good, over
the transition reverses de pattern of specialization, and it converges from above to a
steady state k¯ δy <k ∗ with complete specialization in the labor intensive good.
5.3 If k0 <k ∗ then the economy completely specializes production in the labor intensive
good and converges from above to a k¯ δy <k ∗ when k¯ δy <k 0, and from below when
k0 <k ¯ δy.
With this background in place, I study the eﬀects of diﬀerences in the ﬁnancial inter-
mediation sector. To keep the model tractable I assume that the depreciation rate of
capital δ is the same in all economies and that the only diﬀerence among them is in
the cost to convert units of the investment good into units of new capital. Speciﬁcally,







t,w i t hτ ∈ [0,1).22 Using this speciﬁcation the parameter τ
can be seen as a measure of the transaction cost of ﬁnancial intermediation.23 Iw i l l
21When the economy with a larger depreciation ra t eo p e n st ot r a d ef r o mt h es t e a d ys t a t eu n d e r
autarky relative factor prices w/r decrease over the transition to the new steady state. Thus in
the sense discussed before the Stolper-Samuelson theorem still holds under the presence of diﬀerent
depreciation rates.
22The linearity of g preserves the perfect aggregation property of consumers problems exploited in
Section 3. With identical agents one could assume a more general non linear, increasing function g of
it as for instance in Marcet and Marimon (1992) and the results I derive next would still hold.
23Larger transaction costs of intermediation are known to be the result of imperfect information,
lack of enforcement of contracts, idiosyncratic risks, and ineﬃcient institutions, among other frictions.
17continue assuming that in all but one economy the ﬁnancial intermediation cost is zero
and that for the remaining economy τ > 0.
I show in what follows that under the maintained assumptions Propositions 4 and 5
hold with minor modiﬁcations. I start looking at the steady state under autarky for
the economy with larger transaction costs. From the ﬁrst order condition (9) of the
consumer’s problem at the steady state it follows that: β((1 − τ)rτ +( 1− δ)) = 1,
therefore r∗
τ = r∗/(1 − τ)a n dk∗
τ <k ∗. Once international trade is allowed the factor
price equalization theorem applies again and the argument in Proposition 4 rules out
the existence of a steady state with positive production of both intermediate goods.
Thus for k0 ≤ k∗ the economy with larger transaction costs specializes production in
the labor intensive good. For this economy to attain the steady state with complete
specialization in the capital intensive good, the initial capital must be suﬃciently large,
and τ < 1 − (l∗/ν∗)1−θ must hold, otherwise the only possible steady state involves
specialization in the labor intensive good for all initial conditions.
The results in the last section together with Proposition 5 suggest an interesting eﬀect
of international trade on the evolution of wealth inequality. Proposition 5 provides
conditions, in addition to relative abundance of factors, under which an economy
may initiate a new transition to the steady state from above after the opening to
international trade. Suppose that the stock of capital for the small economy at the
moment of opening to international trade is such that k¯ δy <k t <k ∗
¯ δ.U p t o t h a t
moment, inequality in the economy has been increasing, but because of the opening
to trade with the rest of the world, inequality initially will jump, and then it will
decline over the transition to the new steady state. Thus, trade may reverse the
dynamics of capital accumulation and wealth inequality when transaction costs are
not the same among economies. Notice also that, unlike the original Heckscher-Ohlin
model where dynamics of prices and aggregate variables are unambiguously linked
to relative factor endowments, the connection between wealth dynamics and factor
endowments is less clear once transaction costs in the ﬁnancial sector are taken into
account. For instance, we could think of two small open-economies with similar factor
endowments and diﬀering only in their depreciation rates, say ¯ δ1 > ¯ δ2. If the capital
labor ratio in the economies is smaller than in the rest of the world when they open to
trade, then the ﬁrst economy would converge to k ¯ δ1y, and the second economy to k ¯ δ2y,
where k ¯ δ1y <k¯ δ1y. An interesting situation appears when the initial capital labor ratio
of the two economies lies between the two steady state levels. In this case inequality
would jump and keep declining over the transition in the ﬁrst economy, whereas it
would fall and keep increasing in the second.
185.2 Does trade increase the real income of an economy?
Even if Proposition 5 shows that international trade may be bad in terms of the long
run stock of capital in a small open-economy, it is not obvious that the real income of
the economy will also shrink in the long run when there are diﬀerences in transaction
costs. Will trade promote a decline in the real income of such an economy?24
To answer this question I assume that the diﬀerences between economies are due to
a larger depreciation rate (the argument for diﬀerent transaction costs is analogous)
and I compare the present value of the economy at the autarky steady state to its
present value under trade, denoted respectively v(¯ δ)a n dˆ v(¯ δ). To this end, let ψ(¯ δ)=
v(¯ δ)/ˆ v(¯ δ). Using the technology to produce good z, the equilibrium conditions for l∗,
















x)¯ δ and ˆ y∗,( p∗
y/p∗
x) stand for domestic production of good y and
equilibrium prices under autarky and under trade respectively. The next proposition
states conditions under which the value of the economy at the steady state under
autarky is larger than that with international trade.
Proposition 6. For all ¯ δ suﬃciently close to δ, ψ(¯ δ) > 1.
Proof: Since ψ(¯ δ) is a continuous function of ¯ δ it is suﬃcient to show that ψ(δ) > 1.
Using the fact that ˆ y∗ = kη
y =( k∗(1 − ν∗)/(1 − l∗))η when ¯ δ = δ and the economy
specializes production in the labor intensive good y, then with the equalities in (23)
it follows from (26) that ψ(δ)=( 1− l∗)/(1 − γ) > 1, where the last inequality comes
from the deﬁnition of l∗ and the fact that θ > η.
The intuition behind Proposition 6 is that there are costs and beneﬁts associated to
the opening to trade for an economy with a larger depreciation rate than in the rest
of the world. The costs can be measured by the reduction in the stock of capital due
to complete specialization of production in the labor intensive good. The beneﬁts
come from the change in relative prices, which increases real income. Therefore the
closer is ¯ δ to δ, the larger will be the reduction in the steady state level of capital
under trade, and at the same time, the smaller will be the change in relative prices.
Stated diﬀerently, when the diﬀerence in relative goods’ prices between autarky and
24This question is a version of the “immiserizing growth” problem studied ﬁrst by J. Bhagwati.
Bhagwati (1958) showed that the growth process of an economy could deteriorate its terms of trade
suﬃciently so that the economy would end up with a smaller real income than before the expansion.
Here I ask whether the contraction of the economy as a consequence to trade has a negative eﬀect on
its real income, even though the contraction does not change the terms of trade.
19trade is small, the amount of capital embedded in imports is too small to compensate
the actual reduction in capital in the small economy. Thus, the implication is that
economies where the cost of ﬁnancial intermediation is relatively close to that in the
rest of the world may actually loose real income. However, Proposition 6 does not need
to hold when the diﬀerences in the costs of ﬁnancial intermediation are suﬃciently
large. A simple numerical example will suﬃce to make this point. For instance, with
β = .99, θ = .8, η = .4, γ = .6, δ = .025 and ¯ δ = .0805, real income is essentially
the same under both, autarky and international trade. The same conﬁguration of
parameters but with ¯ δ = .1 produces ψ = .8035, hence real income is larger at the
steady state with international trade, even though the stock of capital is smaller than
under autarky. This example is interesting because it suggests that international trade
is able to alleviate the eﬀects of frictions in the ﬁnancial intermediation sector.
6 Conclusion
In this paper I develop a dynamic Heckscher-Ohlin model to study international trade
eﬀects on personal income inequality and the interaction between international trade
and the ﬁnancial intermediation sector. In my model, transitions to steady states
from below (from above) promote an increase (a decline) of inequality in the personal
distribution of wealth. International trade, on the other hand, promotes a decline
(an increase) in the functional distribution of income if the economy converges to
the steady state from below (from above). My results suggest that the eﬀect of in-
ternational trade on the personal distribution of wealth dominates the eﬀect of the
transition.
I also show that trade favors complete specialization of production in labor intensive
goods in economies where ﬁnancial intermediation is more costly. Thus, the ﬁnancial
intermediation sector may have a key role on the determination of the pattern of
production in a small open economy. Furthermore, I ﬁnd that economies with larger
costs of ﬁnancial intermediation are likely to beneﬁt more from specialization and
trade than economies where these costs are only slightly larger than in the rest of the
world. In fact, these latter economies converge to a steady state where the present
value of their production is smaller than under autarky.
The results in this paper show that the evolution of wealth inequality may not always
increase or decline following the opening to international trade. It would be interesting
to incorporate exogenous growth into the model. In such a model wealth inequality
would increase in economies with higher than average growth rates, and it would
decrease in economies with growth rates smaller than average. Testing such a model
in the data would shed light on the relationship between growth and inequality, and
20indirectly, between international trade and inequality. This extension is left for future
work.
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227A p p e n d i x
Proof of Lemma 1: For a given stock of capital k in operation at period t the ratio of
equilibrium interest rates under autarky (r) and under trade (ˆ r) when the economy












where py and p∗
y stand for equilibrium prices of good y under autarky and trade
respectively (time subscripts are dropped to simplify notation). py/p∗
y =( k/k∗)(θ−η)γ,
thus py/p∗
y is increasing in k and r/ˆ r =1i fk = ˆ k1. The deﬁnitions of ν∗ and l∗ imply
that ˆ k1 <k y. It follows that r/ˆ r>1f o rˆ k1 ≤ k ≤ ky.F o r ky ≤ k ≤ k∗ the same
conclusion holds because inside the cone of diversiﬁcation ˆ r =( 1−β(1−δ))/β,i . e .t h e
equilibrium interest rate at the steady state under autarky. Similar arguments apply
to show that w/ˆ w<1 for all k ≤ k∗. With the deﬁnition of ˆ k2 t h es a m er e a s o n i n g
can be used to establish the results corresponding the case of k∗ ≤ k ≤ kx where the
economy specializes production in the capital intensive good x.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 : From Lemma 1 ˆ k1 <k y and that ˆ k2 >k x,t h u sf o rky ≤
k0 <k ∗ (k∗ <k 0 ≤ kx) Lemma 1 applies. Furthermore, since k0 is inside the cone
of diversiﬁcation ˆ w jumps and ˆ r falls to the corresponding stationary levels under
trade. Next, let ωi
0/ω0 = Nsi
0 denote the ratio of agent i wealth to average wealth
immediately before the economy opens to trade and ˆ ωi
0/ˆ ω0 = Nˆ si
0 under the new
equilibrium prices with trade and assume that ky ≤ k0 <k ∗. Choose an agent with
ki
0 <k 0 and assume that for that agent si
0 ≥ ˆ si

































The term in square brackets is strictly positive when ky ≤ k0 <k ∗, since over the
equilibrium path under autarky wt ≤ ˆ w and Rt ≥ ˆ R ∀t. Thus (27) contradicts the
fact that ki
0 <k 0. Therefore si
0 < ˆ si
0. A similar argument applies to show that
si
0 > ˆ si
0 if ki
0 >k 0. Also, by construction si
0 =ˆ si
0 if ki
0 = k0. Next, order agents
according to increasing wealth and denote by ¯ i the agent with the largest wealth share
smaller or equal to average wealth in the economy. It is straight forward to check that
si
0 ≤ si+1
0 implies that ˆ si
0 ≤ ˆ si+1









i=N−J si ≤ 1 −
PN
i=N−J ˆ si =
PN−J−1





i=1 ˆ si for all J ≤ N, with equality only for J = N. Therefore if
ky ≤ k0 <k ∗ inequality falls and remains constant after the opening to trade. Since
23α < 0, under autarky inequality would continue increasing up until the corresponding
level at the steady state. The argument for the case of k∗ <k 0 ≤ kx is analogous.
Computation
A brief description of the numerical method is as follows: starting from an arbitrary
function v0 of the state k for the value function, perform iterations on the Bellman
Equation associated to the corresponding planner’s problem on a grid of points. The
decision rule for capital accumulation is approximated with piecewise linear functions
between grid points. Thus with this method the corresponding version of the Euler
Equation holds exactly at points in the grid (see for instance Huggett (1993) for further
details). 25 Once the decision rule for capital has approximately converged I simulate
a transition towards the steady state over 1000 periods and I compute the objects of
interest. To simplify the computation of inequality over time I use the coeﬃcient of
variation (standard deviation over the mean). This measure is convenient because it







The computation is further simpliﬁed because I need to solve only a planner’s problem
for a given initial distribution of capital, given that cv(ωi
0)=R0sd(ki
0)/ω0, and prices
and average wealth can be recovered from the optimal allocation.
The parameter values used in the benchmark simulations are described next. I use
β = .99 and δ = .025 which are commonly used in applied work for the U.S. economy
simulating quarterly data. For the parameters in the technologies I use γ = .5, θ = .38
and η = .34. These parameter values produce a capital share about .36 which is again
standard in the quantitative literature. I have computed transitions with several values
for the parameters above, α, and initial initial distributions.
25In practice I use 1300 evenly spaced points in the grid. Computing time is small given that there
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Figure 4: Timing eﬀects of the opening to international trade along a transition
from above.
2